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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
when a litigant files an affidavit setting forth "grounds" therefor within
twenty days after arbitration. 110
In Bayer v. Ras,"' the Rochester City Court granted the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss the defendant's application for a trial de novo after
a hearing before an arbitration panel had resulted in an award for the
plaintiff. The defendant alleged that there was a question of fact to be
decided by a jury -the evidence of an alleged contract of purchase
by the defendant. The Monroe County Court reinstated the applica-
tion, holding that the "simple affidavit required" should be treated
not "as an application addressed to the discretion of the de novo court,
but.., rather in the nature of a note of issue, a procedural mechanism
only.""l2
The Bayer decision was a necessary step to insure that no constitu-
tional deficiency or litigant dissatisfaction jeopardizes the compulsory
arbitration program's tremendous potential for reducing the courts'
civil case load. 18
ARTIcLE 50- JUDGMENTS GENERALLY
CPLR 5015: Court has inherent discretionary power to relieve party
from judgment after lapse of statutory period.
CPLR 5015(a) allows a defendant to open an excusable default
"within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or order with
written notice of its entry on the moving party," or, if he has entered
the judgment or order, within one year after entry. This provision how-
ever, does not preempt a court's inherent common-law right to set aside
its own judgments at any time in the interest of justice." 4 Recently, in
110 22 NYCRR 28.12.
"'171 Misc. 2d 464, 336 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
112 Id. at 468, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 265. A prior rule required an affidavit setting forth
"substantial grounds" for a trial de novo.
118 In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23 (1899), the United States Supreme
Court held that compulsory arbitration does not violate the seventh amendment as long
as an appeal from the decision is allowed, stating:
[The Constitution] does not prescribe at what stage of an action a trial by jury
must, if demanded, be had, or what conditions may be imposed upon the demand
of such a trial, consistently with preserving the right to it.
Pennsylvania has had a program similar to New York's in operation since 1952. Its
constitutionality was upheld in In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed
sub. nom. Smith v. Wissler, 850 U.S. 858 (1955).
n4 The Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure has stated that "[t]he court's
inherent power to relieve a party from the operation of a judgment in the interest of
substantial justice is not limited in any way by the proposed rules [i.e., the CPLR]."
TH= REP. 204.
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram,115 the New York City Civil Court, New
York County, used its inherent power to open a default after the lapse
of the statutory period where strong evidence of unconscionability was
presented.
The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate a default
judgment entered against her more than three years previously on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment. The
defendant alleged that she had not been served with process in the
action, but had learned of the default judgment shortly after its entry.
For more that three years, she made payments on the judgment ex-
ceeding $1,700, leaving a balance of over $300 at the time of the motion
to vacate. The original purchase price of the freezer which was the
subject matter of the action was approximately $1270. The defen-
dant, realizing that the judgment was exorbitant, complained to the
New York City Department of Consumer Affairs which provided her
with an attorney who made the motion. The court held that the defen-
dant had waived any objection to jurisdiction over the person by volun-
tarily making payments on the judgment over the three-year period.""
Nonetheless, the court vacated the default in the interest of justice,
declaring that "[t]he courts must provide the necessary instrumentality
to pierce the shield of caveat emptor when it is sought to be used as a
sword at the throats of the poor and the illiterate.""17 The defendant
was granted leave to file an answer in the action so as to permit her to
establish that she was the victim of a fraudulent sales scheme.
The court's use of its inherent power to open defaults in the
interest of justice should prove particularly useful in combatting the
contemporary problems of the low income consumer beset by the prey-
The inherent power of New York courts to set aside their own judgments has long
been well-established. See, e.g., Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N.Y. 825, 19 N.E. 842 (1889); In re
Marsh, 242 App. Div. 290, 275 N.Y.S. 79 (2d Dep't 1934) (per curiam); Mondo v. Estate of
Mento, 33 App. Div. 2d 650, 305 N.Y..2d 341 (4th Dep't 1969) (mem.); Maloney v. Mc-
Millan Book Co., 52 Misc. 2d 1006, 277 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Syracuse City Ct. 1967). See also 9
CARMODY-WAIT 2d, § 63:163, at 105 n.16 (1966); 5 WK.&M 5015.12.
One authority has suggested that the statute imposes a requirement of stronger evi-
dence explaining the default when a judgment is to be opened after the lapse of the
one-year period. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5015, commentary at 580 (1963).
115 71 Misc. 2d 787, 337 N.Y..2d 245 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
116 Id. at 788, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
117 Id. at 789, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 248, citing 7B McKINNar'S CPLR 5015, commentary at
580 (1963). The court also cited Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S2d
264 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969), a case involving the same plaintiff, wherein a sales
transaction was declared unconscionable under § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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alence of "sewer service" and the consequent abundance of default
judgments. 18
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR art. 52: Court voids assignment of judgment to buyer of judg-
ments for the purpose of execution.
New York has established a public policy against champerty and
maintenance, 119 presently embodied in section 489 of the Judiciary
Law, 20 which prohibits the purchase of claims by persons engaged in
the business of buying claims for the purpose of bringing an action
or proceeding thereon. In Bottenus v. Blackman,'21 the Supreme Court,
Nassau County, recently applied the statute to void an assignment of
a judgment to a person in the business of buying judgments who
sought to execute thereon.
The respondent, admittedly in that business, acquired a judgment
against the petitioners for a nominal consideration and sought to levy
on their home pursuant to CPLR 5236.122 Holding that the respondent
was in the business of collecting claims, 28 that a money judgment is
a claim,124 and that the judgment enforcement procedure under CPLR
article 52 is a proceeding within the purview of the Judiciary Law, 25
the court refused to enforce the judgment. "The essential policy con-
siderations of section 489," the court concluded, "apply fully to the
case at bar."'126
118 See DeFeis, Abuse of Process and Its Impact on the Poor, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1
(1971).
119 See Transbel Inv. Co. v. Roth, 86 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Champerty is an
arrangement under which an uninterested third party maintains another's suit, at his
own expense, in consideration of receiving a part of the proceeds of the litigation. Main-
tenance is the support or promotion of the litigation of another. BLAcK's LAW DIarIONARY
292 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
120 N.Y. JUDICARY LAW § 489 (McKinney 1968).
121 71 Misc. 2d 583, 36 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
122 CPLR 5236 sets forth the procedure for the sale of real property to satisfy a
judgment. The debtor's right of redemption after an execution sale has been abolished.
See 6 WK&M 5236.02.
123 71 Misc. 2d at 584-85, 836 N.YS.2d at 793.
124 Id. at 585, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 794, citing Blackman v. Pincus, 167 N.Y.L.J. 18, Jan. 26,
1972, at s 15, col. 3 (App. T. 2d Dep't); Roslyn Say. Bank v. Jones, 69 Misc. 2d 733, 380
N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
125 71 Misc. 2d at 586, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95, citing Blackman v. Pincus, 167 N.Y.L.J.
18, Jan. 26, 1972, at s 15, col. 8 (App. T. 2d Dep't); Lee v. Community Capital Corp., 67
Misc. 2d 699, 824 N.YS.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 561, 578 (1971). But see Rosenkrantz v. Salvo Realty Corp.,
65 Misc. 2d 467, 817 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971); People v. Berlin, 65 Misc.
2d 245, 817 N.YS.2d 191, dismissed, 66 Misc. 2d 1034, 823 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Nassau County Ct.
1971); cf. First Natl Bank v. Felder, 69 Misc. 2d 812, 31 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk
County 1972).
128 71 Misc. 2d at 587, 886 N.Y.S2d at 795.
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